Abstract. We present a new method to forge ElGamal signatures if the public parameters of the system are not chosen properly. Since the secret key is hereby not found this attack shows that forging ElGamal signatures is sometimes easier than the underlying discrete logarithm problem.
Introduction
ElGamal's digital signature scheme 4] relies on the di culty of computing discrete logarithms in the multiplicative group IF p and can therefore be broken if the computation of discrete logarithms is feasible. However, the converse has never been proved. In this paper we show that it is sometimes possible to forge signatures without breaking the underlying discrete logarithm problem. This shows that the ElGamal signature scheme and some variants of the scheme must be used very carefully.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ElGamal signature scheme. In Section 3 we present a method to forge signatures if some additional information on the generator is known. We show that signatures can be forged if the generator is smooth and divides p ? 1. Hence for example = 2 is an insecure choice. In Section 4 we discuss the case where the public parameters are not chosen by the user itself. The authority that chooses these parameters may generate some trapdoor information, which will allow it to sign arbitrary messages for any user. Section 5 contains a brief description of some possible countermeasures. In Section 6 we discuss a variant of the ElGamal scheme over Z Z=nZ Z with n = pq, which was believed to be as hard as factoring and computing discrete logarithms. However, the factorization of n can often be derived from known signatures. Moreover, we show that in this case computation in only one of the groups IF p or IF q is su cient to forge signatures. Again it is not necessary to discover the complete secret key of a user to generate signatures.
? to be presented at Eurocrypt '96 ??
revised April 16, 1996 (Corollary 2, which was incorrect in the LNCS version has been corrected in this version of the paper.) r k (mod p) and s (h ? x A r)k ?1 (mod p ? 1):
The pair (r; s) is a valid signature on h.
Veri cation of a signature. Any user knowing the public key y A can verify the signature by checking that 1 r < p and the following equation are satis ed. h r s y r A (mod p)
The ElGamal signature scheme can be broken when discrete logarithms in IF p can be computed. The prime p must therefore be chosen large enough to prevent the computation of discrete logarithms by the number eld sieve 6] and p ? 1 must contain at least one large prime factor to disable the algorithm of Pohlig and Hellman 13] . The value h that occurs in the signature is normally not equal to the message to sign, it is rather the result of a collision free hash function applied to the message. This avoids the existential attack described in 4]. It is important that the veri er checks whether 1 r < p is satis ed. If he would accept signatures where r is larger than p then any signature (r; s) on h could be used to generate a signature (r 2 ; s 2 ) on an arbitrary hash value h 2 by setting u h 2 h ?1 (mod p ? 1). This implies h2 hu (y A ) ru r su (mod p): Now (r 2 ; s 2 ) can be found by setting s 2 su (mod p ? 1) and by computing r 2 satisfying r 2 ru (mod p ? 1) and r 2 r (mod p) by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem. This kind of attack will for example be used in Section 6.
Weak generators
The security of the ElGamalsignature scheme depends heavily on the parameters p and . The following theorem shows that ElGamal signatures can be generated when some additional information on the generator is available.
Theorem1. Let p ? 1 = bw where b is smooth and let y A g xA (mod p) be the public key of user A. If r and k are known, such that r k cw (mod p) with 0 < c < b then it is possible to generate a valid ElGamal signature (r; s) for all h with h x A r (mod gcd(k; p ? 1)) can be found. In particular when r is a generator of IF p then it is possible to generate an ElGamal signature for all h.
Proof. First we show that the equation wz (y A ) w (mod p)
can be solved for z. It follows from p?1 = bw that the subgroup H generated by w has order b. Since b is smooth it is possible to compute discrete logarithms in H by using the algorithm of Pohlig and Hellman 13], so that z can be found. Now let
It is important that f divides h ? cwz and this condition is satis ed if and only if h x A r (mod gcd(k; p ? 1) Thus it follows from Theorem 1 that valid signatures can be generated when h x A r (mod gcd(k; p?1)). If p 1 (mod 4) then gcd((p?3)=2; p?1) = 1 and thus signatures for all h can be generated. If p 3 (mod 4) then gcd((p?3)=2; p? 1) = 2. This implies that signatures for one half of all h's can be generated. u t
Thus if the generator is chosen badly then signatures on every given message can be found without knowing the secret key. Choosing = 2 is exceptionally bad since it allows to forge signatures for all odd primes p and at least one half of all messages h. Such small generators are sometimes chosen in order to get an e cient exponentiation. It should be noted that this attack succeeds because of the special choice of r, which reduces the discrete logarithm problem in IF p to the discrete logarithm problem in a subgroup of IF p with smooth order. Another attack that is based on the fact that discrete logarithms in small subgroups are computable has been described recently by Menezes Qu and Vanstone 11] . (Their attack shows that authenticity is not guaranteed in a few Di e-Hellman based key agreement protocols.) 4 
Constructing a trapdoor
The public parameters p and may be xed so that every user in the system uses the same group and generator. Such a convention is attractive because it allows the use of shorter public keys. Additionally, signatures can be computed and veri ed much faster by using precomputed exponents 2]. However, the authority choosing the prime p and the generator for a signature system may additionally generate some trapdoor information that can be used to forge arbitrary messages later.
One way to generate a prime p such that IF p has a trapdoor has been pointed out in 1, p.50]. The prime p can be generated together with a polynomial that is highly suitable for the number eld sieve. The authority will then be able to compute discrete logarithms faster than a user who does not know the trapdoor 5]. However, this gives only a moderate advantage and can be avoided by chosing the prime p su ciently large. Moreover, such primes can be recognized fairly easily 14].
Here we present another way to generate a trapdoor. An authority that can choose the public parameters p and can generate these parameters such that it additionally knows secret values r and k satisfying the constraints of Theorem 1. We illustrate this possibility by giving two di erent methods to generate the trapdoor. The rst method shows how a generator and the trapdoor information can be generated given a xed prime p. The second method shows how a prime p and the trapdoor information can be generated given a xed small generator . There is no guarantee that these methods succeed. However, the probability of success is su ciently high to threaten the security of the system. This attack is practical when a generator r = cw of IF p can be found in reasonable time. When b is too small then no generator of the form cw may exist.
However, the number of generators of IF p is '(p?1). Since n='(n) = O(ln ln(n)) (see for example 7]) we expect to nd a generator after O(lnln(p)) trials.
When k is chosen uniformly from the set of all 1 k < p?1 that are relatively prime to p ? 1 then = r k ?1 is a random generator of IF p . Thus it is impossible to detect the trapdoor as long as no false signature has been published. However, the trapdoor can be reconstructed from a given false signature (r; s) on h since h y r A r s (mod p) implies h ks (mod w). In order to nd k it is then su cient to compute log (r) (mod b) and this can be done e ciently as b is smooth. 
Countermeasures
The attacks shown in Section 3 and 4 can be avoided if signatures (r; s) are considered to be valid only if | additionally to the other conditions | r is not divisible by a large prime divisor q of p ? 1. This condition should always be checked by the veri er. Moreover, an authorized signer will almost always generate a valid signature since it is very unlikely that he randomly generates an r that is divisible by q. Such a condition has been included in the digital signature standard (DSS) 12]. Hence the DSS is not susceptible to the attacks presented in this paper.
Alternatively trapdoors may be avoided if the authority that is choosing the public parameters p and is forced to use an algorithm like the one proposed by NIST for the generation of p in DSS. The values produced by this algorithm allow to verify publicly that the parameters have indeed been generated by the algorithm. This would make it very hard for a dishonest authority to create a trapdoor. The two methods to generate trapdoors shown in Section 4 indicate that both p and must be generated with this algorithm if no other steps to prevent the attacks are taken.
Yet another possibility to avoid the attacks might be to modify the equations for signature generation and veri cation (see for example 9] for an overview of ElGamal variants). Such a variant must be chosen carefully since other problems may arise. For example if a signature on h is computed by r k (mod p) and s x A + hkr (mod p ? 1) and therefore veri ed by s y A r hr (mod p) then a chosen message attack is possible if the signer can be forced to sign a message h where gcd(p ? 1; h) is large. Any such signature leaks information about the secret key x A since s x A +hkr (mod p?1) implies s x A (mod gcd(p?1; h)). A special case of this attack has been discussed in 9]. 6 An ElGamal scheme over Z Z=nZ Z
In 15] Saryazdi has proposed a variant of the ElGamal signature system using (ZZ=nZZ) where n is the product of two large primes p and q. The author hopes that the security of the proposed signature system relies on the factoring problem and the discrete logarithm problem. Moreover, the existential attack shown in 4] seems not possible in that scheme, because this attack requires that the order of the group (ZZ=nZZ) is known. However, Horster et al. observed in 10] that the signatures leak information that can be used to factor the modulus. Even though their attack does not work as described it is possible to modify the attack in such a way that it works for Saryazdi's scheme as well as the improved scheme proposed in 10]. Moreover, we show that computing discrete logarithms in only one of the two groups IF p or IF q is su cient to break the scheme.
Description of the scheme. In Saryazdi's variation of the ElGamal signature scheme every user A chooses two large primes p and q and computes n = pq. Then he tries to nd an integer 2 (ZZ=nZZ) with order (n). Furthermore he chooses a random element x A and computes y A = xA (mod n). p; q and x A are kept secret whereas n; and y are published as A's public key. To sign h 2 Z Z=nZ Z user A chooses a random number k 2 (ZZ=nZZ) and computes r k (mod n)
s (h ? x A r)k ?1 (mod '(n)) (2) Then (r; s) is the signature on h where h is either the message or the hash value of a message. A verifyer accepts a signature (r; s) on h if 1 r < n and h (y A ) r r s (mod n): This scheme does not allow a modulus n that is common to all users, since every user has to know '(n) in order to be able to compute signatures.
